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The problem of the relationship between the mind and the object 
is longstanding and complex. The shift toward emphatic identification, 
in which the object contains no inherent meaning or significance other 
than that which the mind projects onto it, represents a psychological 
turn that ushers in modernism. Such standing point is characterized by 
the notion that “life can no longer have meaning; it can only produce 
meaning.”(1)   
As the critic Peter McCormick points out, representation relies 
on the “problems not only with the notion of interpretation, but with 
its uses in reading history.”(2) The history of modernist aesthetics, 
then, involves the complexities of the subject/object relationship, 
which constitutes the central problem of modernist aesthetic 
investigation: Whether we talk of language, pictures, ideas, or beliefs, 
every representation has two sides, one as an ordinary thing in the 
world and the other as an icon of the world.  So representations seem 
to be both inside the world and outside it. (3)    
Faced with this epistemological problem of whether the mind 
receives meaning or creates it, the modernist relationship with the 
object is complicated by the question of whether the mind and the 
object maintain an intuitive symbiotic relationship as in the 
Bergsonian notion of ‘flux’(3), or whether they are irreconcilably 
separate as in the Moorean rejection of idealism. Balancing idealism 
and materialism, G.E. Moore insists that objects exist apart from our 
perception of them, but that consciousness is also a reality.(4)  Indeed, 
although the mind must have the external world to respond to, the 
responses are most important.  There are certain states of mind that 
take precedence and are “the raison d’être of virtue”; these, G.E. 
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Moore writes in Principia Ethica, “may be roughly described as the 
pleasures of human intercourse and the enjoyment of beautiful 
objects” (32). Moore, who is the promoter of the aesthetic vision in 
the Bloomsbury Circle, emphasizes the concept of ‘states of mind’.  
As described by John Maynard Keynes, a Bloomsbury member: 
“These states of mind were not associated with action or achievement 
or with consequences. They consisted in timeless, passionate states of 
contemplation and communion, largely unattached to ‘before’ and 
‘after’. Their value depended, in accordance with the principle of 
organic unity, on the state of affairs as a whole, which could not be 
usefully analysed into parts.”(5)   
The Bloomsbury critic, Roger Fry, maintains that content and 
form are intertwined and inseparable. Such position is essentially due 
to his encounter with Cézanne’s paintings. The literary critic Gillian 
Naylor describes Fry’s famous discovery of Cézanne as a ‘revelation’ 
that seems to revitalize his notion that form and content are not 
forever separated: they are interconnected. The need to ‘represent’ 
external reality as the source of internal reflection is now being 
replaced by empathetic identification in which internal reflection 
‘expresses’ external reality, opening the way for a new modernist 
abstraction:  Fry’s discovery of the significance of form enables him 
to re-evaluate his ideas about the nature of content. Content could now 
be divorced from the need to represent or symbolize appearances, and 
become an end in itself.(6) There is a dialogical tension between formal 
presentation and representation itself.  
In Cézanne’s numerous paintings of inanimate objects, such as 
his series of apples, a new tension is created between representation 
and a strong sense of form as an expression of feeling.  This was a 
distinct break with impressionism and led the way toward cubism and 
other form—conscious abstract art.  Fry had experienced a series of 
setbacks in the years prior to 1910, the year of his groundbreaking 
Post-Impressionist Exhibition.  
As long as reality is valid as an artistic expression, it is as valid 
as any other ‘representation’ of reality, including the realism that has 
always been taken for granted as the only valid ‘aspect’ with which 
the artist could engage. That is, content and form are collapsed into 
one another, in an attempt to reach a purely abstract visual art.   
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In his influential book, Vision and Design (1920), Fry makes the 
case for what he calls the ‘imaginative life’ as one in which “the frame 
of the mirror, then, does to some extent turn the reflected scene from 
one that belongs to our actual life into one that belongs rather to the 
imaginative life.”(7) Fry’s formalist aesthetics calls for a strict 
separation of art and life. A word of art is just a work of art. Frames 
and techniques, such as preserving the picture plane, serve to remind 
the viewer of the relationship between content and form.  Fry places 
perception between these two poles:  
 The artist’s attitude to natural form is, therefore, 
infinitely various according to the emotions he wishes 
to arouse.  He may require for his purpose the most 
complete representation of a figure, he may be 
intensely realistic, provided that his presentment, in 
spite of its closeness to natural appearance, 
disengages clearly for us the appropriate emotional 
elements.  Or he may give us the merest suggestion of 
natural forms, and rely almost entirely upon the force 
and intent of the emotional elements involved in his 
presentment.  We may, then, dispense once for all 
with the idea if likeness to Nature, of correctness or 
incorrectness as a test, and consider only whether the 
emotional elements inherent in natural form are 
adequately discovered, unless, indeed, the emotional 
idea depends at any point upon likeness, or 
completeness of representation. (37-8).  
 
Fry concludes his book,  Vision and Design , with an 
explanation of his and Clive Bell’s celebrated concept of ‘significant 
form,’ in which the modernist empathetic epistemology can clearly be 
seen: “I think we do all agree that we mean by significant form 
something other than agreeable arrangements of form, harmonious 
patterns, and the like. We feel that a work, which possesses it, is the 
outcome of an endeavour to express an idea rather than to create a 
pleasing object.  Personally, at least, I always feel that it implies the 
effort on the part of the artist to bend to our emotional understanding 
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by means of his passionate conviction some intractable material which 
is alien to our spirit.”(Vision and Design 302) 
For Fry, the central aesthetic issue, as Allen McLaurin states, is 
the “balance between representation and autonomy.”(8) Perhaps the 
most often repeated distinction, Fry makes in his art criticism, is 
between what he calls ‘actual life’ and ‘imaginative life’.  Despite 
Fry’s “fondness for dualist formations, such as linear and plastic, 
order and variety, vision and design and so on,” (23) he remains 
committed to the notion that the imaginative relationship with the 
object is transcendent, and that art, whose purpose is to express an 
idea through objects, should be free from all traces of what he calls 
“associated ideas” (242) of daily experience.           
In a gesture that looks forward to the New Criticism of the 
1930’s, Fry’s aesthetics stresses the autonomy of art, not only visual 
art, but verbal art as well. In fact, Fry never fully resolved the issue of 
form versus content in visual or verbal art, despite the frequent 
associations of Bloomsbury aesthetics with the privileging of form.  
Regarding content versus form in visual art, Fry received some help 
from a friend, the French critic Charles Mauron,  
Mauron’s article “The Nature of Beauty and Literature,” 
published in 1926 is a cornerstone of the new artistic direction of Fry. 
Fry translated the article and found it enormously useful:  “It enables 
us for the first time dimly to grasp what it is of which the relations are 
felt by us when we apprehend aesthetically a work of literature.”(9)   
Mauron’s conception of aesthetics, in contrast to the theories of 
formalist art critics like Roger Fry and Clive Bell, returns us to the 
original Greek meaning of the word aesthesis –sense experience.  In 
Aesthetics and Psychology, Mauron reproaches Fry and other 
formalist critics for having unsuccessfully traded feeling and 
perception both rooted in human experience, for untenable 
abstractions.(10) If Fry tries to evade the presence of individual 
peculiarities into his aesthetic theory, Mauron, by contrast, insists that 
such peculiarities actually define the aesthetic response.  Mauron 
maintains that art “is not the reproduction of nature but a deformation 
of nature, a kind of extract destined to bring into relief certain 
relations, which would otherwise be lost among insignificant 
detains.”(11)   
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As an extract from the larger world, art affects us only if it is 
composed and selectively arranged so as to provoke sensations and 
responses that, while vaguely familiar, nevertheless astonish us with 
their strangeness. It is unfortunate, according to Mauron, that the 
words typically used to explain art, such as ‘symmetry’ and 
‘proportion’ demand a precision that art itself consistently denies.(33)  
For, although an artist’s process of selection may resemble a 
scientist’s careful attention to detail and arrangement, Mauron claims 
that his final goals are quite different.  Unlike the scientist, the artist 
tries to transmit an infinite complexity that cannot be reduced to 
definite terms, mathematical laws or formulas: “If the aim of science 
is the creation of a formula that of art is the creation of the object” 
(34).  What differentiates definition or formula from artistic object is 
sensation: “[One] can add as many terms as one likes to a formula; it 
can never in any way attain the character of a sensation” (35).  
Dismissing formulaic definitions of art and aesthetics as having 
no more than a Platonic value, Mauron asserts that future attempts to 
discourse upon art or the theory  must take place in what he refers to 
as the ‘vital zone’: “There must be [ …] a vital zone placed between 
the Formula and the Chaos, and experience alone can fix its 
limits”(37-8). This ‘vital zone’ is a place, where impressions are 
coloured as much by sensation as by intellect. The aesthetic attitude, 
then, rests on a “curious mixture of sensation and inhibition—the first 
depending on the second for its keenness, richness, and duration” (33). 
The mind finds itself suspended “at the point where pleasure becomes 
manifest, between the stimulus and the response” (38). 
According to Mauron, then, art depends on a sensibility keenly 
aware of what he terms the “murmur of echoes” (39). Artistic 
production involves the experience of perceiving an external object or 
event while simultaneously undergoing an interior, corporeal response 
to that externality. The aesthetic response requires both an artist and a 
viewer to register not only the externality, but also the bodily events.  
It is precisely this ability that distinguishes artists from non-artists.         
Mauron provides Fry with a new term that connects inner 
qualities with outer ones in an empathetic identification that, as D. 
Dowling points out, seems “to connect shape with emotion in a more 
precise, scientific way than Bell has in his rather mystical assertion of 
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‘significant form’.”(12)  The trance state, a state that Mauron also 
presents as essential to the creative art, enables a moment of belief 
that is simultaneously a moment of ‘transport’. In other words, the 
trance is the vehicle by which the imagination is rendered mobile.   
Virginia Woolf’s corporeal creativity anticipates Mauron’s 
assertion that the ideal state of mind for the artist consists of a 
contemplation kinetically charged by a keen awareness of the body 
and its myriad sensations.  Between 1916 and 1920, Woolf, Fry and 
Bell (Bloomsbury members) explored the relationship of visual and 
verbal arts.  Bell’s views on significant form eventually appeared in 
his Art (1914):  
Certainly the essence of a boat is not that it conjures up 
visions of argosies with purple sails, or yet that it 
carries coal to New castle.  Imagine a boat in complete 
isolation, detach it from man and his urgent activities 
and fabulous history, what is it that remains, what is 
that to which we still react emotionally?  What be pure 
form, and that which, lying behind pure form, gives it 
its significance. (142-43)  
 
Bell’s statement reflects the Bloomsbury’s redefinition of 
‘essence’, which involves the perceptual relationship between subject 
and object.   
As the intellectual leader of the Bloomsbury, then, it was Fry 
above all whose views mattered at the time, and his sense of the 
‘internal forces’ of art (Vision and Design 9) could clearly be heard.  
There is a shift from its traditional position of idealistic universality to 
internal function that Fry calls ‘creative vision’ in which the artist 
combines inner and outer to form pattern that rely on both, but are 
‘crystallized’ in a process of empathetic identification with the 
exterior: “The artist’s main business in life […] is carried on by means 
of a kind of vision, which I will call creative vision” (51). 
Fry’s search for the most evocative term for the combination of 
sympathetic and empathetic identification that characterizes his 
understanding of Cézanne’s réalisation takes him from Bell’s 
‘significant form’ to his own ‘creative vision,’ to Mauron’s 
‘psychological volumes’.   
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Woolf develops visual aesthetics in which the empathetic 
perceptual self, consisting of the eye and memory, combines with the 
exterior to create the “inner landscape” (85). This visual aesthetics 
resides in light and its different spectrum of colours (the prism). 
Prismatic colour is the key to Woolf’s aesthetics.(13) This colourism is 
seen as challenging to Fry’s and Bell’s aesthetics.   
There is a change in Fry’s conception of Post-Impressionism 
between the First (1910) and Second (1912) Post-Impressionism 
Exhibitions. In 1910, Fry saw Post-Impressionism as “colour-broad” 
(Transformations 128); in 1912, colour was replaced by Bell’s “more 
rigid doctrine of significant colour” (130). Fry does not see Post-
Impressionism as replacing Impressionism, but as learning from 
Impressionism’s romantic emphasis on a pure light. By form or 
‘design’, Post-Impressionism completes the data of sense-impressions 
or ‘vision’.  Fry’s claimed revisionism lies in his notion of ‘plastic 
colour’, the achievement of form through colour planes.  As for Bell, 
“colour is in fact form,” and it is “structural”, an androgyny of 
colourist ‘vision’ and formalist ‘design’.  
Sense-data are momentary. Each patch and arrangement of 
colour represents “any turn in the wheel of sensation” (To the 
Lighthouse 9). Fry’s mechanism is also a kind of roving camera, 
incorporating “the rhythm that obsesses the artist” (Vision and Design 
52).  A painting may group fragments of different common-sense 
objects. Fry maintains that:  
 In such a creative vision the objects as such tend to 
disappear, to lose their separate unities, and to take 
places as so many bits in the whole mosaic vision. The 
texture of the whole field of vision becomes so close that 
the coherence of the separate patches of tone and colour 
within each object is no strong than the coherence with 
every other tone and colour throughout the filed. (51-2) 
 
The frame confers the unity on the painting’s patches of colour.  
It imposes the order: “the square draws its lines round us, and here is a 
chair, a table, glasses, knives” (Collected Essays II 297); a flower 
becomes a whole when “ a ring enclosed what was the flower.”(14) 
Each visual patch for the artist, admits Fry, “is related to other visual 
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patches in the surrounding” (Vision and Design 52).  For Fry, the 
painting’s frame assembles patches of colour into unknown ‘objects’ 
with no name but the painting’s title.(63) Such frame pattern is a 
multiplicity that becomes unity as in Cézanne’s geometrical pattern. 
Fry writes: “The more one looks the more do these dispersed 
indications begin to play together, to compose rhythmic phrases which 
articulate the apparent confusion, till at last all seems to come together 
to the eye into an austere and impressive architectural construction, 
which is all the more moving in that it emerges from apparent chaos.” 
(Cézanne 79)  But from that interpretation to the idea that specific 
colours furnish an iconographic code is a step justified by the 
evidence.   
Fry’s theory of an art, which does not seek to imitate form, but 
to create form, not to imitate life, but to find an equivalent for life, 
becomes very significant (Vision and Design 239).  His art, then, is 
transformational. “Life is not only transformed, but effectively 
disappeared in line with the impersonalising tendency of 
modernity”(337).  
So, the aesthetics interpretation is firmly grounded in the body, 
and that images, whether represented through colours or words, are 
living forms to be savoured and appreciated not merely for the 
meaning they convey, but also for the sensations they arouse.    
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